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[The author, who is the LADB managing editor, recently visited Guatemala, where he lived and
worked as a foreign correspondent from 1983-1992.]
In late March, the Guatemalan guerrillas unilaterally declared that they would end all offensive
military actions against the army as an act of "good will" to pave the way for the rapid advance
of peace negotiations. The rebel announcement led, in turn, to a government decision to end
its counterinsurgency operations, thus marking the start of the first open-ended cease-fire in
Guatemala since the war began in 1960. The cease-fire spurred unprecedented optimism among all
sectors that the war the last remaining armed conflict in Central America is finally coming to an end.
In large part, the sudden end to hostilities was made possible by President Alvaro Arzu's willingness
to crack down on excessive army authority in the country. The Arzu administration, which took
office in January, has carried out a massive purge of corrupt and criminal elements in the security
forces, and it has clearly demonstrated its determination to end military impunity by prosecuting
officers guilty of illegal activities or human rights violations. The government's push to assert
civilian control over the military is seen as the initiation of a far-reaching process of political
"modernization" in Guatemala, which many local analysts believe will usher in a period of
economic, social, and political change.
Notwithstanding the optimism, however, difficult issues must still be resolved at the bargaining
table, beginning with the present agenda item under debate, socioeconomic and agrarian issues.
And, even if the government and guerrillas manage to sign a final peace accord this year, most
analysts warn that the emerging political opening will be marred by violence and instability for
a long time to come, as the country's traditional military and economic powerbrokers struggle
to retain control. First cease-fire in 36 years On March 20, the country's four rebel organizations
grouped in the umbrella Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) unexpectedly
announced that they would immediately cease all offensive actions against the army "in an act of
good faith to make a substantial contribution to the peace process."
According to the rebel communique, the URNG high command ordered all guerrilla columns to
suspend indefinitely attacks against army bases and installations, and cease all offensive troop
movements along highways and in public areas. Within hours of the rebel announcement, President
Arzu reciprocated, ordering the army to end all offensive counterinsurgency operations around
the country. In fact, to demonstrate the government's resolve and emphasize the importance of the
cease-fire, on March 21 President Arzu and most of his cabinet travelled to the municipality of Playa
Grande the country's heaviest conflict zone to allow Arzu personally to announce the cease-fire to
local communities there and order base commanders in the area to cease operations. Playa Grande,
located in the extreme north of the country along the Mexican border, is the place where the Ejercito
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Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) the largest and most powerful of the four URNG organizations
first initiated its operations in the early 1970s. The cease-fire marks the first open-ended agreement
by both sides to halt military operations since the war began. In the past, the URNG has declared
short-term unilateral cease-fires, such as during the general elections last November and during the
pope's visit to Guatemala in early February (see NotiSur, 11/10/95 and 02/16/96).
The military continued "defensive" operations on those occasions, and fighting by both sides
resumed immediately after the cease- fire periods concluded. Thus, the bilateral, open-ended
cease-fire has generated optimism around the country that the war is finally winding down. "It is
the first time that there is an unwritten accord to suspend offensive activities on both sides," said
Foreign Minister Eduardo Stein. "It is a breakthrough. Our hope is that we might be able to sign a
final peace accord on Sept. 15, Independence Day in Central America." Clearly elated, presidential
spokesperson Ricardo de la Torre went a step further: "The war came to an end today, even though
we have not yet signed a peace agreement."
Although the guerrillas are more cautious about predicting a date for a final agreement, the
URNG expressed its enthusiasm as well. "Both sides are showing clear political will to make rapid
advances in the negotiations," said URNG spokesperson Miguel Sandoval. "We believe that 1996
will be the year that peace comes to Guatemala." According to Gustavo Porras, who is leading
the government's peace commission (Comision para la Paz, COPAZ) in negotiations with the
URNG, both sides had discussed the possibility of a cease-fire during their last round of talks in
late February, but no agreement was reached at that time. "The unilateral decision by each side to
carry out a cease-fire means that the negotiations have reached a point of no return, and they are
entering the home stretch," said Porras. "Both sides will now be able to negotiate free from military
pressures, which has never been the case before."
In fact, the cease-fire apparently took the country's political parties and grassroots organizations by
surprise, leaving the nation clearly stunned by the news. "This has come totally out of the blue," said
longtime political analyst Frank la Rue, who heads the human rights group Representacion Unitaria
de la Oposicion Guatemalteca (RUOG). "Unless negotiations break down, this is the end of the war.
The levels of agreement between the government and the guerrillas are far beyond our expectations.
There is a much higher degree of consensus than we thought." Since both sides declared that they
would end offensive actions, no skirmishes of any kind have taken place.
Nevertheless, the URNG has continued to carry out "propaganda actions" in rural areas, some
of which have generated tensions with the government. According to the URNG, the unilateral
cease-fire only refers to offensive actions against army troops and installations, meaning that
nonthreatening rebel actions to educate the civilian population such as town occupations to hold
political meetings with villagers will continue indefinitely. "We can't be totally inactive because
we haven't reached a definitive cease-fire agreement," said Pablo Monsanto, head of the Fuerzas
Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), the oldest of the four URNG member organizations.
On March 26, about 120 rebels briefly took over the town of Siquinala, in the department of
Esquintla, about 81 km south of the capital. The rebels all heavily armed detained police officers
at the local garrison in town and took away their guns for the duration of the rebel meeting with
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villagers, but no shots were fired and the insurgents returned the arms to the police when they
left. That incident, however, drew bitter criticism from the government, which said it will accept
the URNG's decision to continue "political work" as a reflection of freedom of expression and
organization in the country, but those carrying out such activities must be completely unarmed or it
could force the army to defend affected villages, endangering the cease-fire.
"These incidents must be clarified as soon as possible," said President Arzu. "My government
has declared its willingness to permit political activities by the guerrillas, but only as long as they
are carried out peacefully. That means the rebels must be unarmed when they participate in such
acts, otherwise their actions can provoke confrontations that could jeopardize the cease-fire." The
URNG's decision to continue charging "war taxes" to wealthy landowners along the country's
agriculturally rich South Coast has also caused tensions with the government. Since the start of the
war in the 1960s, the rebels have enforced the taxes which range from US$5,000 to US$20,000 as a
way to finance their activities. "The ceasing of military actions does not eliminate the charging of the
war tax, which is applied to all those landowners whose property is in rebel-controlled territory,"
said Pablo Monsanto.
Nevertheless, the government has come under heavy pressure from the private sector to demand
that the URNG end the taxes or face army retaliation. "These acts are simply extorsion, and the
government must insist that they be stopped at the next round of talks with the guerrillas," said
Humberto Pretti, head of the powerful business umbrella organization Comite Coordinador de
Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF). Still, despite the URNG's
determination to continue such activities, it is unlikely that either its propaganda actions or the war
taxes will lead to a break in the cease-fire. In fact, on April 10, the URNG announced that it will
suspend the war tax as soon as an agreement on socioeconomic and agrarian issues is signed with
the government.
While some analysts see that announcement as reflecting the rebels' flexibility in the negotiations, it
is also a politically savvy concession. It tosses the ball squarely back in the court of the landowners,
who constitute the principal obstacle to an agreement over agrarian issues in the negotiations.
Arzu's purge of security forces paves way for cease-fire The URNG's latest concession regarding
the war tax underscores one of the central reasons why the rebels declared the unilateral cease-fire
in the first place. According to the URNG, the rebels hope that, by offering gestures of "good will,"
they will shore up President Arzu's political power vis-a-vis the military and the country's economic
elite, thereby decreasing the pressure that those groups can bring to bear on the government and
making it easier for the Arzu administration to sign accords with the guerrillas.
"The suspension of offensive military operations was a unilateral decision taken by the URNG
in response to the good will demonstrated by Arzu since taking office," said EGP leader Rolando
Moran. "Since January, the government has reopened peace talks, restructured the army high
command as well as the entire officer corp, and carried out a purge of the police forces, all of which
are central motivations for the cease-fire. We believe that these gestures by Arzu must be met with
gestures on our side so that recalcitrant groups will have no pretext for opposing negotiations.
We want to avoid any possibility that the government could be pressured into closing the political
spaces that are just beginning to open up."
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Clearly, the president's efforts to reassert civilian authority over the army and bring an end to
military impunity is the single most important government initiative since January. It has led to
unprecedented confidence in the peace negotiations by the URNG, and it paved the way for the
rebel cease-fire. Less than two weeks after taking office, Arzu carried out the most far-reaching
shake-up in the army since the country returned to civilian rule in 1986. About 80% of all officers
in the armed forces, nearly 300 officers all told, were rotated around the country. In addition,
many officers were either discharged from the army or forced into paid suspension from duty (see
NotiSur, 02/23/96).
Since January, however, more details have come to light that suggest the shake-up may have been
much more extensive than originally reported. According to the archdiocesan human rights office,
the government has cashiered or suspended at least 53 officers since January including generals
and colonels as well as lower ranking officers for their involvement in human rights abuses or
illicit activities. Moreover, the government has reintroduced legislation in Congress that would
fundamentally alter the terms and conditions governing careers in the army. The bill frozen in
Congress since May 1995 would reduce the maximum service for generals from the current 33 years
to 31, while all other officers with the rank of colonel or below would be forced to retire after 30
years.
If passed, the bill would mean that at least 60 of the 84 officers who now hold the highest ranking
posts in the army would be forced to retire by early 1997, with the bulk forced out this year. As a
result, the commanding officers currently in charge of 24 of the country's 28 military bases would be
discharged by next year. According to Gonzalo Guerrero, correspondent for the monthly magazine
Envio and a longtime political analyst in Guatemala, the army is preparing an even broader purge
of its ranks than would be mandated by the new military career law. "Defense Minister Julio Balconi
estimates that the army now has 200 colonels on active duty, but he told me that the military only
needs half that number," Guerrero, who recently interviewed the minister, told LADB. "That means
100 have to go, representing a planned cut of about 50% in the corp of colonels." Once the new
military law takes effect, all the officers in the army's three oldest graduating classes who generally
remain extremely loyal to one another throughout their careers will be retired. That would leave the
1966 graduating class headed by the army's inspector general, Gen. Otto Perez Molina in seniority
positions, making them the most likely candidates to head the high command and hold other key
military posts.
Perez Molina is widely considered a "moderate" who heads the "institutionalist" faction of the
military that supports political and military reforms in Guatemala and that favors a negotiated end
to the war. Molina is currently the army's representative in peace talks with the guerrillas. And, as
a result of the January rotations, the 1966 promotion that Molina heads dubbed "El Sindicato" by
other graduating classes already controls the seven military bases in the country that are considered
strategically the most important. "The central factor in all these changes is political reform,"
Guerrero told LADB. "Already 53 officers have been either suspended or discharged from the army,
but even for those who were only suspended, the door is now closed. The government is eliminating
'cronyism' in an effort to modernize the state."
According to Guerrero, four central factors were taken into account by the government when
deciding on changes in command positions or the discharge of officers: the support that officers
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demonstrate for reformist or modernizing positions; the existence of evidence implicating officers
in corruption or illicit activities; the role that officers have played in the most serious cases of
human rights violations; and the affiliation of officers in political parties or pressure groups. The
government has clearly stated that it is determined to break the iron grip that hard-line, corrupt
military cliques have held over consecutive civilian governments since 1986, both through purging
the army and police forces and through prosecuting those officers implicated in human rights
violations or common crime.
"The government's policy is to relentlessly attack impunity in Guatemala," said Interior Minister
Eduardo Mendoza in early March. "Although violence and criminality are an endemic problem
in the country, most efforts by past governments to combat those evils have been unsuccessful
precisely because of the system of official corruption within the security forces. There are officers in
the security apparatus who direct or support organized crime and for that reason we will continue
the process that we began in January of purging the security institutions."
Indeed, the government's latest actions in March demonstrate the will to convert words into deeds.
In the first half of March, the government arrested five active-duty officers in four different cases
of corruption. Among those arrested were Col. Mario Lopez Serrano head of the important military
base in the conflictive department of El Quiche and Col. Rolando de la Cruz, head of security at the
Aurora international airport. Both were arrested on suspicion of involvement in drug trafficking and
car-theft rings. In late March, the government also arrested retired Col. Luis Gordillo Martinez, who
participated in a three-member military junta that briefly governed the country in 1982 when a coup
d'etat brought retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt to power. Gordillo was caught driving a stolen car and
is being charged with involvement in car-theft rings.
Against this backdrop, the guerrillas believe the government has the political will and the real
space to carry out the reforms necessary for a peace accord, thus providing the URNG with
justification for its unilateral cease-fire. "There is a major difference between President Arzu and
the previous government headed by ex-president Ramiro de Leon," said Rodrigo Asturias, head of
the Organizacion del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), another of the four groups that make up the URNG.
"The new president has much greater determination to act independently, and he has much more
real power in the country. Arzu has demonstrated noteworthy eagerness to purge the police and the
armed forces of officers responsible for human rights violations."
Rocky road still ahead for peace process
Most local political analysts say that the government's push to reassert civilian control in the country
represents the start of a lengthy process of political modernization that will create the conditions
not just for the guerrillas to put down their arms and join the legal political process, but for the
development of a broad-based opposition movement capable of pushing economic and social
reforms in Guatemala. "The peace process represents the continuation of the 1944-1954 reform
period," Tania Palencia, a longtime political analyst and consultant for NGOs in Guatemala, told
LADB. "
When the CIA-backed coup in 1954 overthrew the government of Jacobo Arbenz, it cut off the
process of building a modern state capable of enforcing the rule of law, and it ushered in a
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'counterinsurgency state.' The peace process is now pushing the country back on the path of state
modernization, whereby Guatemala is finally moving toward a political process based on co-
governability."
According to Palencia, Arzu represents the "modernizing" faction of the country's economic and
political elite, and the president has thus lined his cabinet with business and political figures
who support state modernization. Minister of Agriculture Luis Reyes Mayen, for example, was
previously head of the business umbrella group CACIF and in that role helped form CACIF's
"peace commission," aimed at providing the private sector with input in the peace process. The
current ambassador to the US, Peter Lamport, is also a prominent businessman closely connected
to the peace talks. Lamport is heavily involved in the nontraditional export sector, which strongly
supports an end to the war to create the stable conditions necessary for eventual integration into the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). "The entire executive cabinet is in the hands of
moderates," said Palencia. "As for the army, it is ceding political space because it is dominated by
officers committed to restructuring and modernizing the Guatemalan state."
Nevertheless, Palencia and others warn that the present period is an extremely unstable one, since
the process of modernization implies an immense realignment of economic, social, and political
forces in the country. "Arzu's rise to power basically represents the incorporation of the private
sector and other powerful groups into the project of state modernization," Palencia told LADB. "But
that implies a realignment of forces and the development of new strategic alliances. Far-reaching
internal battles among elite groups are inevitable." Indeed, so far opposition by powerful business
associations particularly the agricultural organizations that represent the country's conservative
landowners have blocked the signing of an accord on socioeconomic and agrarian issues, which the
government and URNG have been negotiating for well over a year (see NotiSur, 03/15/96).
Discussion of tax reform to make the tax system more just, and ideological as well as practical
differences on the size and role of the state in national development, have bogged the talks down.
The crux of the deadlock, however, is the discussion of modern agrarian policies. Agricultural
reform is traditionally an explosive topic in Guatemala that greatly contributed to the overthrow
of the Arbenz government in 1954 and has kept all governments since then from carrying out any
significant policies aimed at modernizing land tenure in the country. Guatemala has one of the most
skewed patterns of land ownership in Latin America. Fewer than 2% of landowners own 65% of the
farmland, and about a third of the rural population lives on farms too small or too poor to support a
family, according to the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
"In the negotiations, the URNG has been pushing for new policies that could eventually provide
land for some 100,000 families, and that is simply explosive," said another aging political analyst
interviewed by LADB who participated as an activist in the 1944-1954 period and who has closely
followed the peace negotiations. "The URNG is pushing for a modern agrarian policy in the country,
not precisely agrarian reform, which makes the whole issue confusing. But in Guatemala, the land
question is still tabu." Not surprisingly, at the latest round of talks on March 27-30 in Mexico, no
accords were signed on any of the socioeconomic issues under discussion.
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According to UN mediators in the talks, the agrarian question was not even touched in this last
meeting and has been postponed until the next encounter, for which a date has not yet been set.
And, even when the current agenda item is resolved, the two sides must still negotiate military
reforms as part of the next agenda item up for discussion: measures to fortify civilian power and
redefine the army's role in the country. Clearly, Arzu's efforts to purge the security forces and
crack down on impunity provide substantial progress on that issue in preparation for its discussion
by both sides. In fact, the Ministry of Defense is now preparing a proposal for reducing and
restructuring the army for peacetime, which will be placed on the bargaining table. The proposal
will likely include the dissolution of the country's Patrullas de Auto-Defensa Civil (PAC), which
include some 500,000 people around the country. Nevertheless, recalcitrant military cliques can be
expected to fight reforms every step of the way, making the process of demilitarization an uphill
battle that will often turn violent. According to the government, since January, corrupt officers
affected by the purge are already responsible for a wave of violence in part aimed at retaliating for
the government reforms and forcing the Arzu administration to limit the scope of the changes.
During January and February, an upsurge in kidnappings gripped the country. In those two months,
the police reported 50 abductions compared with 150 tallied by the police in all of 1995 although the
number of kidnappings may be much higher since many cases go unreported to the police. Many of
the abductions are kidnappings for ransom and the victims are often members of extremely wealthy
families. In addition, assassinations and criminal activity especially car theft and violent crimes
swelled in the first two months of the year.
"We are convinced that the current wave of violence is part of a plan to create a sensation of chaos
and fear in the country," said Interior Minister Mendoza in early March. "The plan is aimed at
causing citizens to lose faith in the Arzu administration and thereby weaken the government's
authority to push the peace negotiations forward. This crime wave has its base in the corrupt
elements that have infiltrated the security forces. They are reacting to the government's efforts
to dismantle their power structures by attempting to show through force that we don't have the
capacity to take them on."
In fact, even if the government succeeds in carrying out political reforms and eventually signs a
peace accord with the guerrillas, political and social violence may actually become worse, creating
instability for a long time to come as powerful groups struggle to maintain control outside of
government institutions. Writing in Envio, Gonzalo Guerrero calls the present instability the start
of post-war violence in Guatemala, and, with some irony, suggests that the upsurge in criminal
activity since January represents the first stage of "privatization" in the country. "[The purge of
security forces] has affected numerous illicit businesses that were carried out for years under
the shield of authority," wrote Guerrero. "Their disarticulation could represent the first effort at
privatization under the new government the privatization of illicit businesses that were historically
linked to public power. The wave of kidnappings could foreshadow the new face of business for
the individuals displaced from their posts in January and February." [Sources: Envio (Nicaragua),
February, March 1996; Notimex, 03/07/96, 03/25/96, United Press International, 03/25/96; Inforpress
Centroamericana (Guatemala), 02/22/96, 02/29/96, 03/07/96, 03/14/96, 03/21/96; New York Times,
03/12/96, 03/27/96; Inter Press Service, 02/27/96, 03/20/96, 03/23/96, 03/26-28/96; Agence France-
Presse, 03/06/96, 03/13/96, 03/14/96, 03/21/96, 03/24/96, 03/26-28/96, 03/30/96; Reuter, 03/14/96,
03/20/96, 03/21/96, 03/27/96, 03/30/96; Excelsior (Mexico), 04/01/96; Tico Times (Costa Rica), 04/05/96;
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Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE, 03/04/96, 03/08-10/96, 03/12/96,
03/15/96, 03/17- 22/96, 03/24/96, 03/28-30/96, 04/01/96, 04/08/96, 04/10/96]
-- End --
